Introduction
In the first half of the 20th century the influence of political ideology both on the internal political processes of numerous countries and on their international relations reached its peak.
Today there are multiple definitions both for "ideology" in its general scientific sense, and for "political ideology" with differences in meaning, but none of them are universally accepted.
In the most common sense, in Russian language ideology is defined as "a mindset and a system of views and ideas" (Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian language, 2001) and accordingly this system can be either widespread, held by a certain social group or an individual.
It may be either public or latent. In this context, political ideology is seen as a system of political views, ideas and directives, including those of the public authorities.
To make the notion of political ideology instrumental, it is best to conceptualize it as a structural and functional phenomenon which determines political decisions and actions and having certain functions in the processes of interactions aimed at acquiring, holding and using public authority. Utilizing this approach, political ideology can be defined as a "systematized and conceptualized set of ideas and directives used for the identification and self-organization of certain groups in the space of authority, the articulation and representation of their interests, relevant changes in state policy based on collective views of the past, present and future development of society" (Soloviov, 2007: 347) .
"Groups in the space of authority" may be either ruling or oppositional social groups or their coalitions, or the ruling political actors and their clients. Low-profile, intentionally concealed sets of views, ideas and directives about public authority, i.e. latent political ideology, may be used for self-identification, self-organization and the intra-group articulation of the interests of ruling groups. A different publically promoted political ideology, differentiated for internal and international political representation, may be used for the public articulation and representation of the interests of ruling or oppositional groups, the motivation for policy or its change.
The following functions of public political ideology, formed by representatives of professional and ruling groups specializing in ideological issues as an element of the informational and communicational support of political processes, can be distinguished: the reflection and representation of group interests; provision for or support of the political course pursued by the ruling social group, political power or party; boosting the support of the ruling social group, political power, party or the submission to the ideas and aims of numerous social classes by utilizing propaganda or agitation; confrontation with and struggle against other ideologies, doctrines and aims.
It was due to the ontological confrontational nature of public ideology, among other factors, that in the first half of the 20th century many people fell victims of totalitarian ideologies both in the process of the establishment of totalitarian regimes in a number of countries, and in the course of the Second World War.
In the first half of the 20th century in the majority of democratic countries even rival nontotalitarian ideologies were based on varying systems of values and had different plans for the future of society. For example in European states, the political ideals of social-democrats were different from the goals proclaimed by liberal, conservative, catholic or agrarian parties. The electorate of the parties of that time was usually limited to support of one or several classes or social groups, which also promoted the conflictive character of politics.
The tragic events of the Second World War led humanity to an understanding of its need for a common axiological and legal framework, ensuring the peaceful coexistence of countries and peoples. This resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and declared by resolution 217А(III) of the UN General Assembly on 10 December, 1948. At the voting, only 8 of 58 UN states abstained and none voted against it (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2007 ). This declaration, despite not being legally binding, fundamentally determined that the main universally adopted social value is the human being, his/her dignity and inalienable rights, the recognition of which, according to the preamble of the declaration, is "the basis of freedom, justice and universal peace".
The adoption of human rights and freedoms as a system of universal values by sovereign countries constituting the UN arguably served as the starting point of the process usually defined as deideologization -the elimination of the influence of ideology on mass political conscience and social processes (Pogorely & Philipov & Fecenko, 2010) , which lead to the beginning of "post-ideological era" (Zinoviev, 2003: 178) or, to be more precise, "the era of the downfall of classical political ideologies" (Halapsis, 2010) .
The theoretical interpretation of this process in political science is in the form of the thesis that "ideology has come to an end". According to Soloviov, "in the 1950s and 60s, Aaron, Shills and a bit later Bell and Lipset raised the question of "the end of ideology"… [which] mainly stemmed from criticism of totalitarianism, primarily Stalinism, as the form of authority which turned ideology from a political factor into the primary foundation for the whole system of political power…" (Soloviov, 2007: 348) .
In 1989 the "end of ideology" thesis in a different interpretation was reflected in an article by Fukuyama, "The end of history?", which contained the following assumption: "What we are experiencing now is probably not only the end of the Cold War or yet another period of post-war history, but also the end of history as it is, the end of the ideological evolution of 5 mankind and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of government" (Fukuyama, 1990 ). Fukuyama probably meant by "the end of the ideological evolution of mankind" that the basic social values of liberalism -the human being, human rights and freedoms, besides becoming the formally universal value of the modern world, has become, to a certain extent, a part of reality for most modern countries as the basis of their system of adopted ideas and values .
The institution of human rights and freedoms was formally legalized in December 1966 in international pacts on civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. In that period, not a single one of 122 states constituting the UN voted against those pacts, which came into effect nine years later in March 1976. Currently these pacts have been ratified and observed by 186 and 164 respectively of the 193 sovereign states with UN membership (The international pact on civil and political rights; The international pact on economic, social and cultural rights).
Although the vast majority (no less than 85%) of UN countries have legally recognized human rights and freedoms through participation in these international pacts, the real situation looks different. According to Freedom House, in 2014 only 88 sovereign countries could be considered free, i.e. properly observing political rights and civil liberties, and only 123 states were considered to be electoral democracies, i.e. fulfilling the minimum requirements for democracy -free and fair elections (Freedom House, 2015) .
It is true to say that countries pursuing the path of democratic development or having adopted this path, if they have not completely lost all ideology in the above sense, they have surely ended the confrontation of ideologies. Even determined opponents of the "end of ideology" thesis admit significant transformations in the "sphere of the ideology of western countries" according to terminology of Zinoviev (2003: 178) or the "ideological space" according to Zhizhek (1999: 93) .
Changes in political systems and social structures in developed democratic countries after the Second World War and the consolidation of democratic regimes have gradually lead to more common political views of rival parties. For example, the influential social-democratic parties in Western Europe have abandoned the idea of socialism and have adopted the ideological concept of the development of liberal capitalism. The ties of parties with the traditional electorate have become weaker, and in pursuit of votes they have begun to court all social and professional groups. Under such conditions, social and class differences between parties have gradually become blurred, and the claims of political ideologies promoted by certain political parties to the position of a universal future projection of their countries have inevitably become irrelevant.
With time, the functions of ideologies and party programs have diminished so much that they 6 have become a kind of political marker helping parties to mobilize their supporters in preelection periods.
The basic values of modern democratic states are determined not by a certain ideological structure shaped by the ruling political party or coalition, but by the majority of society and the non-fringe political powers which recognize the observation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms as the first and foremost responsibility of the state. Nowadays, unlike the old-time uncompromising fighting and confrontations of political ideologies, political projects and programs for the development of society and state compete on a unified platform of basic ideas and values.
However in the modern world, besides countries ruled by democratic regimes, including those meeting only the minimal requirements for democracy, there are quite a few countries governed by non-democratic, authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes (Nisnevich, 2016) . For these regimes, although, to a much lower extent and in softer forms of appearance, political ideology has retained its value as an instrument used "to support the social supremacy and the self-legitimization of the regime" (Soloviov, 2007: 351) and to rally and mobilize the masses in pursuit of its certain interests and goals.
For modern authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes, the "end of ideology" apparently has not come yet, an analysis of the political ideologies of such regimes seems to be a timely and Table 1 . Malaysia nationalism is used to promote the consolidation of the local multi-racial, poly-ethnic and multi-confessional society. In Brunei it is an important ideological structure which justifies the existence of this small Malay state on the huge Kalimantan island.
The ideological triad "state-society-individual", the hierarchic structure of which is instrumental for the evaluation of various political approaches and ideologies. In authoritarian monarchies there are two mutually associated peaks. One peak represents the monarchic state, while the other is the society in form of religious communion. The only exception is Swaziland which has only one peak of ideological triad -the state. People and their rights and freedoms play a subordinate role under authoritarian monarchies. This being said, it is worth noting that the constitutions of such absolute and constitutional authoritarian monarchies as Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, instead of a section describing the human and civil rights and freedoms, have a whole section on the rights and, specifically, the responsibilities of their citizens.
The second subgroup -"communist rudiments" -includes four states governed by authoritarian communist regimes and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), ruled by the last remaining totalitarian communist regime in the world. It is more precise to call it a "nationalist-communist regime". The main features of these countries are outlined in Table 2 . Authoritarian communist regimes formed as the result of transformations of initial totalitarian communist regimes into "softer" authoritarian forms, which are designated as posttotalitarian regimes according to the Lenz-Stephan classification (Linz & Stepan, 1996) . In most cases in the process of such transformation, communist ideology is "reduced" both for rulers and their subjects. The final goal of this "reduction" is for the party establishment to retain the power in changed societies.
The final stage of such "reduction" played a significant role in the crisis and later downfall of the communist regime in USSR. Yakovlev, Ex-secretary and ex-member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU, described it as follows: "Political life in the country became so dogmatic, that even some phrases attributed to Marx and Lenin were regarded as revisionist and suspicious. The level of vigilance raised by the risk of losing power, was far beyond common sense. However, hardly anyone was seriously interested in Marxist-Leninist theory anymore.
Maybe just a small number of people who worked in scientific and educational institutions and made their living by studying it. They had to write clichéd articles and to prepare lectures and seminars accordingly" (Yakovlev, 2003: 367) .
In the triad "state-society-individual", reduced communist ideology proclaims the priority of society in form of a new community. This was called "the Soviet people" in USSR.
But politics is absolutely dominated by an omnipresent state -a "cue ball" according to Huntington -the rulers of which must be obeyed without question and their activities must be totally approved and universally supported.
In DPRK, however, as a result of the transformations, communist ideology hardened.
This started in 1955 when the founder of the country, Kim Il Sung, proclaimed his idea of "Juche" to oppose Marxist ideas brought from USSR and China. It is an ideology of "originality"
or "relying only on the country's own strengths" (Balkansky, 2011: 144). According to Juche, the top of hierarchy is occupied by the decision-making leader, followed by the party which transfers these decisions to the masses, which in turn carry out their leader's will. One of the primary highlights of Juche ideology is the idea of the key role of the leader in the life of the country (Balkansky, 2011: 181-182). DPRK has actively tried to popularize Juche ideology in third world countries.
At the beginning of the 21st century the Juche ideology was backed by the "songun" doctrine which justified turning DPRK into a solid military camp (which it had always been) and gave the army a special role in its political system. This pointed at an evolution in communist ideology in DPRK. After abandoning failed attempts to represent Juche as one of the competing global communist doctrines in the years of Kim Il Sung's reign, DPRK leaders reduced communist ideology to playing an exclusively defensive role, justifying the need to protect the system from outside world and assure their population of the uniqueness of its way of development.
In China, Vietnam and to a smaller extent in Laos (due to its significant underdevelopment) communist ideology has been used for almost 30 years for their transfer towards market economies and bureaucratic capitalism. adopted at the 22nd CPSU congress under Khrushchev. In modern China, for example, the role of the moral regulator of people's behaviour was attributed to the "system of the core values of socialism" . According to the requirements set by the highest members of the communist party of China, these values had a strict "top-down" hierarchy -from state to society and then to the individual. According to , the wealth and strength of the state, not personal freedom, play a primary role in them. So, even in a modernizing and dynamically developing China, state values still play the same essential role in the official communist ideology as in earlier forms of communist authoritarianism.
Unlike China, Vietnam and Laos, Cuba is only beginning its economic reforms.
Accordingly, the future of the communist ideology in this country is as yet unclear. For Cuba, in the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, this ideology was practically a kind of left-oriented nationalism utilized to persuade and mobilize the population to rally against a foreign enemy, the USA. It is possible that in the near future the role of the communist ideology in the country will be reduced to simply justify the claims of the current party establishment for power and the acquisition of property in an already renewed capitalist state.
Postcolonial dictatorships and their political ideologies
The main features of the 18 post-colonial dictatorships are presented in Table 3 . It seems that a ruler having acquired power after military struggle, especially after a longlasting one, coup or rebellion, and having become a dictator, is absolutely convinced of his right to economic and social dominance, and is ready to utilize the principle that "the end justifies the means" to secure and solidify it. This determines the dictator's basic system of views and ideas, the personal ideology of the solitary political actor. This ideology determines the political decisions and actions of the dictator, who utilizes all kinds of violence including the physical elimination of undesirables and all kinds of corruption-not only for personal gain, but also to "feed" his attendants to buy their loyalty.
One may assume that such the personal ideology of the ruler determines the fact that postcolonial dictatorships are the regimes that exercise the most violence, outside the totalitarian DPRK. This thesis is illustrated in Fig. 1 using the dynamics of the average extrajudicial killing index (EKI) values for various subgroups of authoritarian regimes, determined according to the
Chingranelli-Richards database of human rights (CIRI Human Rights Data Project). Note that
lower the value for the index, the higher the level of violence. Specifically, the EKI index, now discontinued, takes the value of 0 if extrajudicial killings were frequent (over 50 times per year), 1 if they took place, but were rare (1 to 49 times) and 2 if there were none at all. Although there are some doubts about the data provided by this database, it can still be used as an illustrative example.
Fig.1 Extrajudicial killing index
However, the personal ideology of the rulers of postcolonial dictatorships is definitely unsuitable for social consumption or the rallying and mobilization of the masses in support of the regimes. These aims require a publically articulated ideology that puts the state at the head of the ideological triad and instils obedience to it into society as a whole and into each individual person.
The ideological diversity of modern African dictatorships also means that some of them use ideologies that seem completely divorced from the African political context. For example, the former Marxist "Popular movement for liberation of Angola -labor party" (MPLA), whose leader, José Eduardo dos Santos has ruled the country since 1979, after abandoning the soviet model proclaimed itself to be a social-democratic party and even joined the Socialist International. However, the formal acceptance of a multiparty system and ideological pluralism did not lead to the end of dictatorship, which has not changed much since the times when it was within the sphere of influence of USSR and was a "socialist oriented country". Another formerly 
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Marxist-Leninist authoritarian regime, the Republic of Congo, followed the example of Angola in many ways. Other authoritarian regimes that have abandoned their former "socialist orientation" are characterised by their ideas of militarism and anti-separatism (Equatorial Guinea) or the defence of political stability against external and internal enemies (Algeria).
In The state is also the top of the "state-society-individual" triad in postcolonial dictatorships, serving as the ultimate "protector and guardian" of the regime.
Neo-authoritarian regimes and their political ideologies
The group of states ruled by so called authoritarian-kleptocratic or neo-authoritarian regimes can be divided into two subgroups.
The first subgroup is comprised of 9 states that were part of the former USSR. Their ruling regimes can be characterized as post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes. The main features of these states are demonstrated in Table 4 . The form of government in these countries is a presidential-parliamentary republic in five cases and presidential republic in three cases. Kyrgyzstan is the only parliamentary republic, but it was presidential prior to 2010. Armenia, which is currently a presidential-parliamentary republic, had a national referendum in December 2015 and has adopted constitutional reform which will turn the country into a parliamentary state. This means it is possible that there will be another parliamentary republic on ex-soviet territory in the near future.
However even considering this possibility, it is clear that for post-soviet neo-authoritarian states, as for African dictatorships, absolute priority is given to forms of government with dominating presidential authority.
Six post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes are personalistic. The regime in Azerbaijan has already become dynastic, and after death of Heydar Aliyev who had ruled the country for ten years, the presidency was passed to his son Ilham Aliyev, while Turkmenistan demonstrated political continuity when it chose the successor for president Saparmurat Niyazov, who died after ruling for fifteen years. Three regimes, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, are corporate in character, ruled by political-economic groups in the first two cases-these regimes can also be described as oligarchic-while in Kyrgyzstanpower belongs to patrimonial clans. In Russia the regime led by President Vladimir Putin is highly personified.
The key characteristic of post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes is that without regard to their personalistic or corporate character, the social groups or their leaders running these regimes are representatives and/or direct descendants of the party and administrative establishment that ruled the USSR.
At the same time, these post-soviet establishments are significantly different from soviet elite in numerous ways including their values and ideologies (Nisnevich, 2015) . While the soviet establishment was still trying to hide its money-focused ambitions, which were most apparent in The Soviet establishment played the role of "local bandit", which "is infinitely interested in its controlled territory and accordingly secures domestic order and provides other social benefits" (Olsen, 2012: 39) . Living behind the "iron curtain" which prevented the members of the Soviet elite from moving to western countries, the elite, having monopolized power and control over property, had to take a certain social responsibility for their citizens. It was also imposed on them by communist ideology, which limited their drive for material wealth.
Basic value for the post-soviet establishment and its ideology is the acquisition of material wealth and social supremacy by utilizing state power. But the essence and institutional mechanism of corruption in the public sphere is the unjustified use of various resources of power not for state functions and social development, but to gain some illegal advantage, personal or group benefits, either material or otherwise (Nisnevich, 2012: 109) . And in this context the ideological justification of corruption, which can be called the ideology of corruption, serves as the personal ideology of social groups that rule post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes. In the 1990s the post-soviet establishment cunningly used the moment of transition to a market economy, completely abandoning their social responsibility upon the pretext that under the new conditions "every person must make one's own living".
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The policy of integrating post-soviet states into the global economy provided vast possibilities for the new establishment to transmit pillaged values into stable and flourishing western countries. In relation to this, the attitude of these people to their own country is like the attitude of a "travelling bandit" (Olsen, 2012: 33) , who inherently cannot have any ideology besides personal gain.
However, the ideology of corruption as the ideology of the ruling post-soviet establishments obviously cannot be made public and clearly cannot be used to rally the masses.
The ideology of a national state, which is most suitable for these needs and natural for ex-soviet republics, is used as an instrument of support for the ruling regimes in all post-soviet countries except Russia. Such ideology becomes nationalistic to different extents in different countries. In
Russia the regime actively promotes the idea of renaissance ("getting up from our knees") and a return to the position of a great power, which has to struggle against the resistance of imaginary "external enemies". The regime is balancing between an imperial ideology and an ideology of supremacism with certain orthodox Christian flavour.
All post-soviet states, despite their neo-authoritarian tendencies, recognize both international pacts on human rights; human rights and freedoms are stated as basic values in their constitutions.
All in all, post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes are characterised by their three-layer ideologies: the ideology of corruption as a latent ideological and axiological basis for the functioning of the post-soviet establishment; the state ideology with a certain shade of nationalism for public use in internal politics, aimed at rallying and mobilizing the masses in support of the existing regime; and the ideology declared in the international political environment for use in foreign politics, imitating devotion to the ideas of human rights and freedoms. For the public, the top of ideological pyramid is de facto occupied by the national state, which requires all efforts to defend its sovereignty.
On the level of public propaganda the ideology of corruption is often translated as "survival skills", dividing modern society into "users" (successful people) and "losers" (unable to live "the right way" and suffering because of that). This is why the struggle against corruption is also ideological in essence, has a certain ideological value and, as noted by Panfilova, "The struggle against corruption, against the dishonesty of civil servants is increasingly changing from the routine activity of some governmental bodies to a demand for a change of values. Even for a revolution of values. In numerous countries people can no longer stand living alongside those who violate basic moral imperatives and, being in authority, impose their ideas on others, on the whole society" (RBC, 2016).
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Among the ruling layers of society the ideology of corruption is becoming popular in form of their perception of power as a chance to change the country into a business project allowing it to gain vast, enormous profits. Through this ideological construct, the neoauthoritarian state became defined as a "state-corporation" in the literature (Fursov, 2006) .
The second subgroup of states governed by neo-authoritarian regimes includes 10 countries. Their key features are demonstrated in Table 5 . All of these countries except for Ethiopia, which is a parliamentary republic, are presidential republics.
Iran is a special case: despite being presidential, it is not the president who is the head of the state, but according to constitution it is the imam (rahbar), the religious "state leader", who is 
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The following features are characteristic of neo-authoritarian regimes existing in the 6
African states, and Sri Lanka, which are similar in their main parameters (see Table 5 ).
First, these regimes were established either after military coups to overthrow more violent dictatorships, or after internal military conflicts including those with foreign interference.
Second, these states, except for Burundi, had periods when they were to some extent under the influence of Marxist ideology. In Ethiopia and Mozambique, Marxist ideology was abandoned by the rulers, a decision much influenced by the downfall of the USSR. In Gambia and Sri Lanka, which formally remain socialist-oriented, as suggested by the official names of these countries, there were foiled military coups plotted by radical followers of Marxist ideology.
In Mauritania, the current regime is still engaged in a military conflict with military and political separatist organization called POLYSARIO which calls itself a socialist movement.
Third, all these states have faced significant problems preserving the unity and stability of the state, since the beginning of their independence and up to the present day. According to the 2015 data, except for Mozambique (86.9) the values of indexes of inconsistency (fragility) of these states (the Fragile States Index) exceed 90, which is the lower border of the danger zone.
For the leaders of these regimes, no matter whether the regime is personalistic (3 African regimes) or corporate (3 African regimes and Sri Lanka), like the post-soviet establishment, the personal ideology is material gain and social supremacy achieved by utilizing state authority, in other words, the ideology of corruption. This is seen in the fact that after the analysis of corruption practices in the countries of West Africa, primarily Nigeria, Geveling introduced the term "kleptocracy" for such political regimes. He determined kleptocracy as the "reign of thieves", which he defines as a "form of the organization of power based on corruption and relevant social and political groups, the members of which seriously violate social convention by utilizing their authority (usually state and political) for quick material gain and the consolidation of their positions within the society" (Geveling, 2001: 10) .
In these countries, the ideology of consolidating the integrity of the country and national sovereignty is used as a public political ideology to rally the masses in support of the ruling regimes. Considering the way they came to power, one can assume that within the framework of such an ideology the regimes have not only abandoned socialism, but also utilize criticism of socialist development, Marxist ideology and radical nationalism.
The regimes of Nicaragua and Venezuela are significantly different from other states in the second subgroup of neo-authoritarian regimes in terms of their coming to power and ideological preferences for rallying the masses. This means that these countries are forming the kind of regime described by Karosers as regimes of "dominant authority", under which the "long-term retention of power by a single political group usually results in massive corruption and crony capitalism" (Karosers, 2003) .
This means that Bolivia and Ecuador are forming neo-authoritarian regimes similar to those in Venezuela and Nicaragua, and if they persevere, they will sooner or later deform the institute of free and fair elections to retain power.
All countries currently run by neo-authoritarian regimes in the second subgroup have recognized international pacts on human rights with the exception of Mozambique which has not joined the pact on economic, social and cultural rights.
All in all, the neo-authoritarian regimes of the second subgroup, are characterized by similar three-layer ideologies to the post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes outlined above.
Conclusion
Modern authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes show a wide range of ideologies.
However, the classic ideologies, either defensive, declaring the need to defend the country's 25 independence and sovereignty from various internal and external threats, or, ideologies of development and modernization in their pure form are becoming increasingly rare. There are two fundamental reasons for this.
The first is the global trend for the grip of ideology on politics to be weakening which also affects third world countries, where authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes are most common. Only rudimentary communist regimes are strongly ideological, because ideology is the main way to justify the monopolization of power by communist parties. However, even in these countries the traditional versions of communist ideology are undergoing significant transformations now that the international socialist system has fallen apart. as the only way to ensure the integrity of the national state and protect it from external enemies by manipulating the notions of the "state" and "legitimate power".
